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I. INTRODUCTION
T here are almost 50,000 inactive or abandoned hazardous waste dispo-
sal sites in the United States. Of these, 1200 to 2000 are believed to
present an immediate threat to the health of millions of Americans.' The
hazardous waste crisis, which has gone largely unnoticed by the public,
now threatens to be today's most pressing environmental problem. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that approximately
750,000 hazardous waste generators are responsible for almost sixty mil-
lion metric tons of hazardous contaminants every year.2 Until recently,
this waste was routinely disposed of in the cheapest way possible with
*B.S., M.B.A., Louisiana Tech; J.D., Tulane University; LL.M., Texas University; Profes-
sor of Business Law, Graduate School of Business, University of Texas at Austin.
**B.A., Penn State; LL.B., Osgood Hall; LL.M., Yale University; Assistant Professor of
Law and Public Policy, Syracuse University School of Management.
***B.A., North Carolina State; J.D., Emory University; Assistant Professor of Business
Law, Graduate School of Business, University of Texas at Austin.
' Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Envtl. Pollution and Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Env't and Public Works,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1979).
' 45 Fed. Reg. 33,102 (1980).
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little or no regard for the environment. As a result of this practice, as
much as "90'/, of the hazardous waste generated has been managed 'in a
manner which potentially threatens human health and the environ-
ment.' "I In fact, the "National Cancer Institute . . . estimates that 60 to
90 percent of the cancers occurring in this country are a result of environ-
mental contaminants. ' 4 Although hazardous wastes make up only a por-
tion of our environmental contaminants, it should be conceded readily
that the harm threatened by carcinogenic, mutagenic and teratogenic
wastes is unacceptable.
The costs associated with the disposal of toxic waste can be classified in
two ways. The first category is made up of environmental losses such as
the contamination of rivers, lakes, and ground water with the resulting
destruction of aquatic life, wildlife, and vegetation and includes expenses
incurred in cleanup. The second category is comprised of losses sustained
by individuals and includes both property damage and physical injury re-
sulting from direct or indirect contact with hazardous wastes. Injured in-
dividuals have two options in their pursuit of compensation: statutory
and common law. This Article argues that statutory recourse is not only
inadequate but also often precludes common law means of redress. The
first section addresses the shortcomings of third-party restitution under
past and present legislation. The remaining sections outline the problems
and inequities of statutes of limitations in the adjudication of hazardous
waste torts.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Superfund Legislation
In 1965, congressional recognition of the hazardous waste crisis led to
the passage of the Solid Waste Disposal Act.5 Primary responsibility for
dealing with the problem was vested in the states. The Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA),6 adopted eleven years later, embodied
a different strategy. This Act was designed to insure the prudent manage-
ment of toxic waste disposal through a national system with authority
given to the EPA to implement state programs that met the exacting cri-
3 Note, Hazardous Waste: Third-Party Compensation for Contingencies Arising from
Inactive and Abandoned Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 33 S.C.L. REv. 543, 544
(1982)(quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084 (1980)).
' S. REP. No. 698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 4491, 4494.
' Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997 (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
(1982)).
1 Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976)(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
(1982)).
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teria of the federal plan.7 It supplied the impetus for an array of both
state and federal regulatory packages that attempted to provide for safer
handling of toxic wastes by both generator and transporter through rigor-
ous performance standards. RCRA also established a "cradle-to-grave"
manifest system that tracked toxics from the generator to the disposal
site; imposed reporting and monitoring requirements on the waste man-
agers; and regulated treatment, disposal, and transportation through a
permit process.'
The regulatory program outlined by the RCRA has led to considerable
progress in the management of toxic waste; however, because it was en-
acted before attention was focused on the enormous hazards posed by
abandoned sites, such as Love Canal, the Act was directed only at cur-
rently-operating sites." To deal in part with this apparent oversight, fed-
eral financial responsibility standards were recently promulgated for haz-
ardous waste facilities.'" These standards are intended to insure that
funds will be available for proper closure of facilities that receive toxic
waste and for backup monitoring and other postclosure measures for
waste sites. The legislation also establishes a pool of funds for use during
the operating life of a facility which provides compensation for those in-
jured by its operation." These provisions for recovery, however, only ap-
ply to active disposal facilities; 2 they fail to compensate those injured
from inactive and abandoned sites.
B. Superfund Legislation
In response to the inadequacy of the RCRA, Congress enacted the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA).' 3 By creating a $1.6 billion hazardous waste
"Superfund" (financed by an excise tax on inorganic toxics, petrochemi-
cal products and crude oil),"' the Act is intended to rectify past statutory
failures.' 5 The purpose of this program is twofold: first, to help offset the
enormous cleanup costs incurred; and second, to pay for damages to the
40 C.F.R. § 256.01 (1984).
E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 6902, 6922, 6925 (1982); 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.1 - 265.430 (1984).
126 CONG. REc. H9159 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980)(remarks of Rep. Gore); Note, supra
note 3, at 547.
*o See 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.140 - .151, 265.140 - .150 (1984).
Id. §§ 264.147, 265.147.
1, See, e.g., id. § 264.147(a) ("An owner or operator of a hazardous waste treatment ...
facility .. .must demonstrate financial responsibility for bodily injury and property damage
to third parties caused by sudden accidental occurrences arising from the operations of the
facility or groups of facilities.").
'3 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982)).
" 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982).
See Note, Joint and Several Liability for Hazardous Waste Releases Under
Superfund, 68 VA. L. REV. 1157, 1159-60 (1982).
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environment caused by leakage. Due to congressional recognition that ac-
tivities involving hazardous wastes are abnormally dangerous, those found
responsible for past abuses will be held strictly liable to the fund for any
disbursements made.
16
While CERCLA is the most progressive step taken to date in effecting
legislative control over this potentially devastating problem, this Act, like
all others before it, unfortunately fails in one crucial regard: it does not
provide for third-party compensation. The fund is not available to com-
pensate those whose injuries are attributable to abandoned or inactive
sites.' 7 Moreover, Congress has failed to pass an equitable statute of limi-
tations and has not delineated causation principles for common law toxic
torts. This leaves private claimants to pursue state court remedies where
litigation costs, statutes of limitation, and the lack of adequate medical
evidence often preclude or severely hamper recovery. An examination of
the legislative history of this Act reveals that several proposed Superfund
packages did provide substantial relief to third parties but, dissuaded by
the level at which the fund would have had to be maintained, Congress
reached the present compromise.'g
III. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
The most serious obstacle faced by toxic tort victims is the barring of
their claims because of the running of the applicable statute of limita-
tions. In addition to the fact that the effects of exposure to hazardous
chemicals do not manifest themselves for as long as twenty years or more
after exposure, many of the traditional justifications for statutes of limi-
tation do not apply. For example, while the memories of parties involved
and witnesses may have faded, many hazardous chemicals do not; thus,
the evidence will still be available. Indeed, the essential evidence for re-
covery-the injury or disease itself-is often not evident for years follow-
ing exposure. Requiring claims to be made before the damage element of
recovery can be shown places society in the untenable position of encour-
aging speculative claims, foreclosing meritorious ones due to lack of evi-
dence, or imposing liability on the basis of evidence that shows only a
possibility of future injury.
The traditional tort statute of limitations begins to run at the time of
injury.' While a minority of jurisdictions still adhere to this rule with
respect to hazardous substances, the majority have adopted a version of
the discovery rule.20 The variations of the discovery rule range from hav-
' 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982).
I ld. § 9611.
IS See Note, supra note 3, at 549-50.
" See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 165 (5th ed. 1984).
20 Thirty-nine jurisdictions have adopted the discovery rule. Some have done this by
statute. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West Supp.
[Vol. 33:491
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ing the cause of action accrue when the plaintiff knows or should have
known that he or she has suffered disease or injury," to when the injured
party ascertains or should have been able to ascertain the causal connec-
tion between the injury and the earlier exposure.2 The latter construc-
tion is the most equitable for toxic tort causes of action because it pro-
vides for the great difficulty that a victim incurs in discovering his or her
injury, how it was caused, and who caused it.
Despite this strong trend, two recent developments threaten to cloud
progress. The first development is the enactment of statutes of repose
which provide a maximum period of liability running from either the date
of manufacture or from the time a product leaves the manufacturer's pos-
session or control with no tolling provisions." However, the interests of
chemical-manufacturer defendants need not be protected in this way, not
only due to the seriousness of their acts, but also because the latency of
diseases caused by exposure has long been known. 4 Thus the potential
for injury is forseeable at the time of a defendant's actions. Statutes of
repose raise serious constitutional and equitable questions as well. The
Florida Supreme Court, for example, in Overland Construction Co. v. Sir-
1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(b) (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2305.10 (Page Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. 15-3-535 (Law Co-op Supp. 1983); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 518(a) (1973). Other states have adopted the rule by judicial decision.
See Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1980) (applying Oklahoma law); Thrift
v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1974)(applying Texas law); Austin v.
Fulton, 444 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1968); Sato v. Van Denburgh, 123 Ariz. 225, 599 P.2d 181
(1979); Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arkansas Nat'l Co., 260 Ark. 352, 538 S.W.2d 577 (1976);
Warrington v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 80 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1969); Owens v.
Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970); Oakes v. Gilday, 351 A.2d 85 (Del. Super. Ct.
1976); Burns v. Bell, 409 A.2d 614 (D.C. 1979); City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla.
1954); Forgay v. Tucker, 128 Ga. App. 497, 197 S.E.2d 492 (1973); Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp.,
50 Hawaii 150, 433 P.2d 220 (1967); Withrell v. Weimer, 77 Ill. App. 3d 582, 396 N.E.2d 268
(1979); Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods., 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979); Corsey v.
State Dep't of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1979); Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 342 A.2d
712 (Me. 1975); Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978); Cannon v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 374 Mass. 739, 374 N.E.2d 582 (1978); Connelly v. Paul Ruddy's Co.,
388 Mich. 146, 200 N.W.2d 70 (1972); Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280 Minn. 147, 158 N.W.2d
580 (1968); Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hosp., 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469 (1966); Grand Island
School Dist. #2 v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 279 N.W.2d 603 (1979); Raymond v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 177 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977); Lopez v. Sawyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563
(1973); Adams v. Oregon State Police, 289 Or. 233, 611 P.2d 1153 (1980); Schaffer v. Larze-
lere, 410 Pa. 402, 189 A.2d 267 (1963); Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1974);
Ohler v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 92 Wash. 2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979); Morgan v. Grace
Hosp., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965); Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979).
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1984).
22 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 518(a)(1973).
23 Birnbaum, Statute of Limitations in Environmental Suits: The Discovery Rule Ap-
proach, 16 TRIAL, Apr. 1980, at 38, 62 n.32.
14 See Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic
Tort Suits, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1683, 1685 (1983).
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mons, found a state statute of repose unconstitutional as applied because
it barred the plaintiff's cause of action before it had accrued.2
5
Second, in 1979 the Supreme Court in United States v. Krubrick" held
that under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), a cause of action accrues
when the plaintiff knows of an injury and its cause, not when the plaintiff
discovers that the injury was negligently inflicted. The Court was princi-
pally concerned, however, with the legislative intent under the FTCA re-
garding prompt legal action against the government.27 That context-the
pursuit of legislative intent-may prevent the application of that decision
to the issue that is being examined here. In sum, the growing number of
jurisdictions adopting the discovery rule, the questionable constitutional-
ity of statutes of repose, and the limited reach of the Supreme Court's
decision in Krubrick afford a basis for some optimism about reform of
statutes of limitations as applied to chemical exposure claims.
IV. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR COMPENSATING Toxic TORT
VICTIMS
In considering how our system of justice should treat injury to a mem-
ber of society, two theories must be examined. First, the social utility of
the action responsible for the harm must be assessed in order to deter-
mine its impact on individual rights. John Rawls, 8 as restated by Frank
Michelman,'2 9 posits a mode of analysis that is particularly applicable in
this context. 0 Second, capitalist economic theory also supplies a market
justification for judicial action in this area.
A. A Theory of Justice
Rawl's A Theory of Justice supports a change from the accrual rule to
the discovery rule by those jurisdictions that have not yet adopted it. In
order to be considered just, a legal doctrine such as a statute of limita-
tions (whether characterized by accrual or discovery) must be
consistent with principles which could command the assent of
every member of a group of rational, self-regarding persons, con-
vening under circumstances of mutually acknowledged equality
and interdependence, to hammer out principles by which they
will judge complaints against whatever rules and institutions may
come to characterize their association.2 '
" 369 So. 2d 572, 575 (Fla. 1979).
" 444 U.S. 111, 122-25 (1979).
21 See, e.g., id. at 123.
21 See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
1 See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1219-24 (1967).
30 See Note, supra note 24, at 1686-90.
"' Michelman, supra note 29, at 1219.
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In Rawisian terms, this hypothetical group of rational, self-regarding
persons is in an "original position" or "behind a veil of ignorance."3 Such
persons do not know what role or what socioeconomic position they even-
tually will occupy in society, nor which sex, nor even which decade or
century will be theirs. By way of this device, Rawls assures us, the rules
that are created will be fair and just for everyone. Since each person in
the original position eventually will be living in a society governed by
these rules, it will be in his or her own self-interest to make certain that
the rules operate to the benefit of those who are most disadvantaged by
inevitable socioeconomic inequalities.2
The fairest outcome may be one in which toxic tort actions were never
limited by a statute; but that approach fails to consider that statutes of
limitations can serve legitimate judicial ends. Consequently, this Article
advances an argument in favor of the discovery rule, as opposed to the
accrual rule, and demonstrates that it fulfills the demands of Rawlsian
analysis while providing the defendant, as well as the plaintiff, with a
reasonable measure of protection. This inquiry begins with Professor
Michelman's view that Rawls is making the following demands on legal
doctrines such as statutes of limitations.
According to Michelman's interpretation, efficiency-motivated princi-
ples of justice, such as utilitarian or cost/benefit principles, that un-
equally affect individuals and groups by distributing losses or costs upon
them, can never be permitted unless the inequality is fairly compensated,
perhaps by way of a transfer payment or comparable means.34 In addi-
tion, inequalities will not violate principles of justice if these inequalities
are subjectively compensated or equalized. 35 For example, if a plaintiff,
losing because of the discovery rule and not otherwise materially compen-
sated, ought to appreciate that such a rule, consistently applied, reduces
long term risk of loss to people like him or her, then the failure to com-
pensate is still fair.
Regarding the first of these criteria-a prohibition against treating un-
equally a few individuals or groups in order for efficiency-oriented mea-
sures to increase the general material well-being of society-little need be
said. In the absence of some compensatory measure, such as payment
from a "Superfund" or at least a meaningful opportunity to bring a civil
lawsuit, no self-interested person in the original position would consent to
such treatment."A While benefits to others in return for the self-sacrifice
of a few might motivate altruistic persons, Rawls finds that self-interest
comes much closer than altruism to characterizing human nature. Hence,
j. RAWLS, supra note 28, at 19.
Id. at 136-38.
3 Michelman, supra note 29, at 1221.
I d. at 1220.
3 Note, supra note 24, at 1687.
1984-851
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he builds his edifice upon the perception of self-interest, certainly a more
widely-recognized and predictable motivation. Beyond that, Rawls uti-
lized the concept of reciprocity implicit in the Kantian proposition that
rule makers should willingly invite the consequences of their rules upon
themselves." Knowing that they would some day be subject to the rules
that were devised from within the original position, it simply does not
follow that self-interested persons would willingly invite upon themselves
the consequence of being deprived of legal redress even before they dis-
covered that they had suffered a potentially compensable loss.
The second of Professor Michelman's observations-that the Rawlsian
concept of justice will be violated unless the victim (a person deprived of
the opportunity to bring a civil lawsuit and one who is not otherwise ma-
terially compensated) can identify with the proposition that this hardship
reduces the long term risk to people like him or her-requires more elab-
orate justification. In fact, Michelman's interpretation itself is arguable.
It proceeds on the assumption that a self-interested person deprived of
material recompense or advantage ought not experience this as a loss if
this deprivation has the effect over time of enhancing the well-being of
other similarly-situated individuals by reducing the risk of loss to them.
Michelman's reading qualifies the self-interest of Rawls' rule makers with
something akin to altruism. So qualified, one can only speculate upon
how far that line of thought can be extended until the value of Rawls'
presupposition; i.e., self-interest, is dissipated to the point of being
inoperative.
Given this critique and the admonition that Michelman's interpretation
should be accorded no more than limited credence, it is nevertheless ap-
parent that a statute of limitations that deprives a potential claimant of a
cause of action even before the injury is discovered is not the type of rule
that can subjectively compensate the victim by instilling him or her with
confidence that risks will be reduced for others. In fact, it appears that
the contrary would be true. What would motivate a firm in a competitive
industry to install toxic control measures voluntarily and finance them
with savings it would otherwise accumulate at the expense of victims? If
the law does not uniformly compel all firms within that industry to con-
tribute to a compensatory fund or to be accountable in court for toxic
torts, voluntary or altruistic control measures would only increase a firm's
costs relative to its rivals and make it less competitive within the indus-
try. This scenario, which very closely parallels observed business behav-
ior, hardly suggests the likelihood of reduced risk to others. Thus, a stat-
ute of limitations that precludes the chance of recovery even prior to the
time injury is discovered is contrary to even Michelman's lenient reading
of Rawls.
37 See KANT, ETHICAL PHILOSPHY 37 (J. Ellington trans. 1983).
[Vol. 33:491
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss3/7
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
B. Capitalist Economic Theory
Capitalist market economics also compels different legal treatment of
toxic torts. Currently, our system of justice does not penalize toxic sub-
stances polluters until a victim litigates; however, victims rarely reach
this point because of the high cost of litigation.3 8 According to Jeffrey
Trauberman, Director of the Toxic Substances Program of the Environ-
mental Law Institute, "the existing legal system fails to allocate the costs
of toxic substances injuries in a manner consistent with the goals of effi-
ciency and equity."39 The polluter profits disproportionately at the ex-
pense of others, which leads to economic externalities.' At this point, the
legal system must decrease transaction costs otherwise imposed upon the
injured victim, if it expects to transfer efficiently or allocate the costs of
toxic substances pollution." If the full societal cost of manufacture is not
incorporated into the price of the waste producing product, these prod-
ucts will be artificially inexpensive and will have an unwarranted advan-
tage in the marketplace." In order to decrease transaction costs, not only
must the toxic tort victim's cause of action accrue at the time of discovery
so as to allow a greater period during which compensation may be ob-
tained, but the legal requirement that the plaintiff must prove causation
as well as defendant's fault also must be altered.'3 With such procedural
and substantive improvements, polluters will be called more often to pay
for the damages they have caused. However, the extended accrual period
for toxic torts will still leave some externalities due to defunct or judg-
ment-proof polluters. Additional measures are required to compensate
victims with no present realistic legal recourse if the full cost of toxic
chemical production and use is to be rationally allocated.
V. CURRENT LEGISLATION
Although legislatures are not stampeding to pass innovative laws, sev-
eral states recently have enacted legislation designed to remedy the legal
difficulties faced by toxic tort victims. Among the solutions are the use of
a rebuttable presumption of liability, creation of additional statutory
causes of action, and establishment of compensation funds. Most at-
" Trauberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Ec-
onomic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 184-85 (1983).
' Id. at 215.
,0 According to several authors, an "externality is present when, in competitive equilib-
rium, the .. . conditions of optimal resource allocation are violated." W. BAUMOL & W.
OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 17 (1975).
" Trauberman, supra note 38, at 185-87.
- Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9
HOFSTRA L. REV, 859, 929 (1981).
" For an exhaustive discussion on decreasing transaction costs associated with toxic
wastes, see Trauberman, supra note 38, at 207-15.
1984-85]
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tempts to deal with the problem have been directed at hazardous wastes
and not to the larger area of toxic substances exposure.
In Pennsylvania, the plaintiff's causation burden is eased by the use of
a rebuttable presumption. The Pennsylvania law specifies that anyone
storing, treating, or disposing of hazardous waste is liable for all damages
incurred within 2500 feet of the area where the hazardous waste activities
have been carried out.4 4 A plaintiff need not prove "fault, negligence, or
causation. '45 The defendant can overcome the presumption only by clear
and convincing evidence that he or she did not contribute to the damage,
contamination, or pollution."
Oregon and Alaska also have statutory causes of action against hazard-
ous waste polluters. Under the Oregon law, the plaintiff must show that
the person in control of the waste acted unreasonably in handling it or
violated a law;47 in effect, the victim must establish a cause of action
based upon negligence." The Alaska statute holds a person in control of
the waste strictly liable for resulting injuries. 49 The remedy is incomplete,
however, because liability extends only to those in control of the waste at
the time of discharge. This precludes recovery if the polluter is unknown
or insolvent.50
Both South Carolina and New Jersey have created funds for toxic tort
victims. The South Carolina fund 5' compensates victims harmed by aban-
doned sites upon a showing that a good faith effort was made to secure
and enforce a valid judgment against the responsible party.52 Not only
will the requirement of a preexisting abandoned site probably preclude
recovery where the polluter is identifiable but insolvent, but the fund
would also be inaccessible to victims who cannot afford huge litigation
costs in order to avail themselves of the fund. Even in those instances
where default lowers litigation costs, such a response is not predictable,
and such a suit does little efficiently to allocate societal costs. While the
New Jersey legislature established its fund to compensate for oil spill dis-
charges, 3 "its coverage may be broad enough to include at least some
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.611 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
41 Id. The Supreme Court endorsed the use of a similar presumption contained in the
Federal Black Lung Benefits Act. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 27-
28 (1976)(presumption that a coal miner with a certain number of years in the mines who
suffers from pneumoconiosis contracted the disease from employment was constitutionally
valid). See also Bartlett, The Legal Development of a Viable Remedy for Toxic Pollution
Victims, 10 BARRISTER 41, 43 (1983).
46 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.611 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
47 OR. REV. STAT. § 459.685 (1983).
48 See Note, supra note 3, at 550.
11 ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (1984).
50 See Note, supra note 3, at 551.
" S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-160 (Law Co-op Supp. 1983).
" See Note, supra note 3, at 551 & n.42.
03 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11a to llz (West 1982).
[Vol. 33:491
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hazardous waste injuries." ' The fund which can reimburse for medical
costs and loss of wages or salaries is financed by a tax on petroleum and
petroleum products. 55 Since there is no credit or reduction to firms for
payments into other funds whose purpose is to compensate claims which
may be compensable under the Act,"6 oil companies in New Jersey have
challenged the financing of the fund. The legislative intent of CERCLA,
however, seems to allow funds which do not duplicate Superfund provi-
sions. 7 In Lesniak v. United States," the federal government stipulated
that section 114(c) of CERCLA did not preclude New Jersey's collection
and expenditure of monies to compensate damage claims for which the
Superfund did not provide reimbursement.59 In Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,60
the New Jersey Tax Court upheld the state taxation plan which finances
the fund.
The California legislature recently created the Hazardous Substance
Compensation Account."' The Account compensates individuals for medi-
cal and income-related costs incurred as a result of exposure to the re-
lease of a hazardous substance.6 2 The claimant must prove that the re-
lease of the hazardous substance proximately caused the loss and one of
the following: (a) that the source of the release or the party liable for it
are unknown and indeterminable with reasonable diligence, 3 or (b) that
the loss is not compensable because there is no liable party or the judg-
ment received could not be satisfied. 64 Victims may present claims from
January 1, 1982 or within three years of discovering injury, whichever
date is later. s5
11 Note, supra note 3, at 552.
5 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11g to .llb (West 1982).
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982).
See U.S.C. § 9614(c)(1982); SENATE COMM. ON ENVT'L AND PUB. WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D
SESS.. INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LE-
GAL REMEDIES, PART 1: THE REPORT AND COMMENTS 83 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter
cited as INJURIES AND DAMACES].
58 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1455 (D.N.J. 1982).
51 Id. at 1456. Section 114(c), as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c)(1982), states:
(c) Contributions to other funds; limitations, etc.
Except as provided in this chapter, no person may be required to contribute to
any fund, the purpose of which is to pay compensation for claims for any costs of
response or damages or claims which may be compensated under this subchapter.
Nothing in this section shall preclude any State from using general revenues for
such a fund, or from imposing a tax or fee upon any person or upon any substance
in order to finance . . . preparations for the response to a release of hazardous
substances which affects such State.
60 4 N.J. Tax 294 (1982), aff'd, 190 N.J. Super. 131, 462 A.2d 193 (1983).
61 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25370-25395 (West 1984).
e' Id. § 25375(a)-(b).
Id. § 25372(a).
I d. § 25372(b).
.' Id. § 25376.
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The newest and most comprehensive legislation for toxic tort victims is
Minnesota's Environmental Response and Liability Act6 6 which applies to
hazardous substances released after July 1, 1983.67 Owners or operators of
waste treatment facilities or dumps and those who knew or reasonably
should have known that the waste accepted for transport to a disposal or
treatment facility contained a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contam-
inant and selected the facility or illegally disposed of the waste,68 are held
strictly liable, jointly and severally for, inter alia, all damages resulting
from death, personal injury, or disease.6 9 The plaintiff need not prove
negligence at the time of exposure but must establish that the defendant
is responsible for the release, that the plaintiff was exposed to the hazard-
ous substance, that the release could reasonably have resulted in the
plaintiff's exposure, and that the exposure caused or significantly contrib-
uted to death, injury, or disease.7" Evidence to a reasonable medical cer-
tainty is not required in order to submit the issue of causation to the trier
of fact."1 Further, the Act preserves a plaintiff's common law remedies"
and implements the discovery rule under its statute of limitations."1 De-
spite the fact that the governor previously had vetoed a similar bill,
claiming that it would destabilize the insurance market and discourage
businesses from settling in Minnesota,"' a recent survey of businesses in-
dicates that during the first nine months of the Act's enforcement, no
companies have left or decided against expanding in Minnesota due to
the law.7 0 In fact, several companies have voluntarily cleaned up sites or
have announced plans to do so."6
VI. PROPOSALS
After an exhaustive study of existing statutory and common law reme-
dies for compensating toxic tort victims, the CERCLA study group con-
cluded that:
Available remedies are inadequate in view of the substantial
number of claims that may arise, and the factual and legal com-
plexities that will be involved in their litigation . . . . (Eixisting
legal remedies and actions . . . [are] inadequate . . . to deal with
the possibility of mass torts, or multiple exposures, and with
66 MINN STAT ANN. § 115B.01-.24 (West Supp. 1984).
67 Id. § 115B.15.
68 Id. § 115B.03.
69 Id. § 115B.05.
Id. § 115B.07.
71 Id.
" Id. § 115B.12.
73 Id. § 115B.11.
• INJURIES AND DAMAGES, supra note 57, at 67-68.
' Broadcast on National Public Radio's Morning Edition (Apr. 2, 1984).
76 Id.
[Vol. 33:491
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss3/7
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
claims by hundreds of victims .... 1
Many procedural and substantive changes in existing remedies are nec-
essary to eliminate the legal impediments which preclude or limit recov-
ery by toxic tort victims. State legislatures must adopt the discovery rule
for the running of statutes of limitations, causation burdens must be re-
duced, state procedural rules must specify that defendants are strictly lia-
ble jointly and severally, allow apportionment of damages, and eviden-
tiary rules must be expanded.
New approaches for compensating victims must be devised. Suggested,
but not yet widely tested, are requirements that hazardous substance gen-
erators and compensation funds obtain bonds or insurance to secure the
availability of funds in the event of release. Such requirements would
help compensate those victims who later obtain a judgment against an
insolvent defendant. However, there are difficulties involved with this ap-
proach. How one should determine the amount of the bond or insurance
coverage and for how long the bond or coverage must be good are as yet
unanswered. Additionally, as one commentator pointed out: "[Ilnsurance
also might cause the industry to regard the premium as a substitute for
careful operations. ''7
Many commentators believe that the existence of some type of compen-
sation fund is essential to equitable, make-whole treatment of toxic tort
victims. 79 Such funds hold out the dual promise of lower transaction costs
than those incurred by litigation and compensation regardless of the eco-
nomic status of the polluter while still shifting the burden of bearing
toxic waste industry costs to those responsible or the class which benefits
from the economic activities that generate the waste. Most persons con-
ceptualize a fund for compensating losses linked to exposure to toxic sub-
stances that is based on sound economic as well as ethical principles.8 0
Potential claimants would include victims physically or economically una-
ble to bear the burdens of extensive litigation."' Legislatures could fi-
nance such a fund in numerous ways, but all involve contributions from
the generators and disposers themselves. The rules governing such a fund
should obviate the need for a claimant's showing of causation sufficient
for the imposition of a judgment and should provide compensation for
losses not covered by CERCLA or other state funds. The better reasoned
approach would not limit the amount recoverable from such a fund since
77 INJURIES AND DAMAGES, supra note 57, at 193.
78 Milhollin, Long-Term Liability for Environmental Harm, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 16
(1979).
11 See, e.g., INJURIES AND DAMAGES, supra note 57, at 194-95; Ginsberg & Weiss, supra
note 42, at 929-40; Milhollin, supra note 78, at 16-26; Trauberman, supra note 38, at 237;
Note, Hazardous Waste Pollution: The Need for a Different Statutory Approach, 12
ENVT'L L. 443 (1982).
See, e.g., Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 42, at 929.
8, See, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 575-76.
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it is impossible to forecast the amount of damage toxic exposure will
cause. However, damages for non-physical or non-pecuniary injuries such
as pain and suffering should be left to private litigation or limited in
some manner to protect the fund's ability to compensate more direct soci-
etal injuries. In order to maintain an adequate level of money, the fund
itself must be subrogated to the rights that a claimant would have had
against responsible parties. 2 Other methods of funding should also be
considered particularly if the fund is to be available for compensation of
claims against insolvent polluters. In addition to direct taxes on the in-
dustry, dedication of fines for violation of toxic waste statutes would be
in keeping with the attempt to allocate societal costs rationally.
11 Trauberman, supra note 38, at 216, 279.
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